NEWS & INSIGHTS
Looking Over The Cliff: The Better Outcome in Safe Harbour
When the Safe Harbour is ultimately tested, what is ‘reasonably likely’ to be a Better Outcome will be subject to significant scrutiny. How much does the AQE need to do, and what is the importance of medium and long-range modelling to ensure going concern and sustainability? What shape does the counterfactual assessment take, and what have our experiences told us is necessary?
THE EVOLUTION OF SAFE HARBOUR
Introduced under the Treasury Laws Amendment (2017 Enterprise Incentives No. 2) Act 2017—a key plank of the 2015 National Innovation and Science Agenda (NISA)—the safe harbour aims to give directors breathing space to restructure distressed but potentially viable companies without immediately triggering voluntary administration or liquidation.
The NISA framed safe harbour as a strategic innovation lever intended to encourage resilience, innovation, and risk-taking by shielding directors during restructuring. It also sought to transform insolvency from a punitive process into an adaptive business tool.
Whilst in operation since 2017, development of the Safe Harbour Law has evolved over the decade before that. In our article In the Beginning: The Genesis of the Safe Harbour Defence we considered the history of the evolution of the Law, from the post GFC enquiries through to the post-Safe Harbour retrospectives.
The Better Outcome
This article focuses on the “better outcome” test and the guidance issued on its application since the implementation of the Safe Harbour reforms.
Section | Detail |
Mechanics | A director can avoid civil liability for insolvent trading of a company where:
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Better Outcome | Section 588GA explicitly defines a “better outcome” in comparative terms: "better outcome", for the company, means an outcome that is better for the company than the immediate appointment of an administrator, or liquidator, of the company. |
Questions |
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INITIAL EXPLANATORY GUIDANCE ACCOMPANYING LEGISLATION
The Explanatory Memorandum noted that:
“Under the safe harbour, directors will only be liable for debts incurred while the company was insolvent where it can be shown that they were not developing or taking a course of action that at the time was reasonably likely to lead to a better outcome for the company than proceeding to immediate administration or liquidation.
Whether a course of action is reasonably likely to lead to a better outcome for the company will vary on a case-by-case basis depending on the individual company and its circumstances at the time the decision is made. It is acknowledged that directors must operate in a rapidly changing and uncertain environment, often without the benefit of complete information, and that directors may consider a range of options and discard them in the process of settling on a course of action.”
Examples of the Better Outcome
It is clear the legislation contemplated that the course of action and better outcome assessment is complex and dynamic. The Explanatory Memorandum did not however list particular markers of a “better outcome” and instead provided some examples and case studies (involving, for example, improved inventory management for a whisky bar and actions taken by a listed resources operator to seek to negotiate payment arrangements with key creditors).
The EM noted practical examples of what courses of action might be considered ‘reasonably likely’:
Actions reasonably likely to lead to a Better Outcome | Actions not reasonably likely to lead to a Better Outcome |
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While the above are practical examples, they do not (of course) provide a particular marker or benchmark in isolation for determining what is or is not a better outcome in each case.
50% RULE DOES NOT APPLY
In relation to “better outcome” the Explanatory Memorandum did note that “The phrase “reasonably likely” does not require a better than 50 per cent chance of a better outcome than the immediate appointment of an administrator or liquidator. “Reasonably likely” here requires that there is a chance of achieving a better outcome that is not fanciful or remote, but is “fair”, “sufficient” or “worth noting”.
The November 2021 independent review
The November 2021 independent review was mandated under 588HA of Act and was conducted between August and November 2021, chaired by Genevieve Sexton. The comprehensive report was covered in our earlier article: SAFE HARBOUR – IS IT FIT FOR PURPOSE?
In relation to the Better Outcome issue it noted:
Section | Detail |
Nature of Counterfactual | Directors should measure their plan against the realistic counterfactual—not theoretical possibilities—i.e. compare ongoing trading vs. immediate external administration or winding-up, or other realistic outcomes like a deed of company arrangement (as opposed to remote theoretical scenarios). “We consider that the appropriate counterfactual will depend on the circumstances the company is facing and, accordingly, the definition of better outcome needs to be flexible enough to accommodate a range of scenarios. The inclusion of both administration and liquidation scenarios provides such flexibility.” |
All or some stakeholders | In relation to key stakeholders, and whether the “better outcome” related to outcomes for all stakeholders, the review noted: “the interests of creditors are already covered by the reference to ‘company’. A director seeking to rely on the safe harbour provisions is doing so because the company is in financial distress and is seeking protection, ultimately, from the duty not to trade the company while it is insolvent. In those circumstances, the case law is clear: directors are under a duty to consider the interests of creditors…. We are also wary of any suggestion that the better outcome needs to be better for creditors as a whole.” “Panel considers it unnecessary for any amendment to be made to the wording of section 588GA(1)(a) to expressly recognise the interests of creditors in the better outcome. We are comfortable that the provision, as currently drafted, requires consideration of the interests of key stakeholders, including creditors and employees.” |
Qualitative or Quantitative? | A quantitative analysis focuses on the return to creditors under the better outcome and counterfactual scenario, whereas a qualitative analysis also takes into account other factors such as the ability of the company to continue to trade. The review agreed that: "the concept of a better outcome involves consideration of both quantitative and qualitative factors. To focus solely on quantitative factors would unduly narrow directors’ assessment of the courses of action available to a company ," However it went on to say: “However, those quantitative and qualitative assessments need to be considered in the circumstance of each company and weighed accordingly. The weight that is given to each will differ depending on the circumstances, but while the overall return to creditors is a significant factor, it is not the only factor and would also not appear to reflect how directors are engaging in this assessment in practice.” |
Objectivity | Reflecting on the application of part 5.3A of the Act, the review noted: “the Panel is also concerned with linking a better outcome too expressly to the objects of Part 5.3A… Caution must be applied in allowing directors (who usually and naturally wish to retain control of the company) to determine a better outcome by reference solely to the business continuing and without regard to what creditors may achieve via an administration.” |
ASIC REGULATORY GUIDE 217 AMENDMENT
RG 217 was initially issued in 2010 and reissued in August 2020. It initially focussed primarily on a directors duty to prevent insolvent trading.
RG 217 was reissued in December 2024 and includes commentary on the development of a course of action, which we covered here:. Spotlight on Safe Harbour - Asic tighten up regulatory guidance. In relation to the course of action, RG 217 states (among other things):
- A director must continue to comply with the general duties set out in the Corporations Act (s180–184) during safe harbour.
- In deciding whether a course of action is reasonably likely to lead to a better outcome for the company, the director should consider the interests of the company as a whole, including the interests of its creditors.
- What is a better outcome for the company will vary depending on the company’s circumstances at the time the course or courses of action are developed, and the decision is made.
- Developing one or more courses of action that are reasonably likely to lead to a better outcome for the company requires considered and meaningful analysis based on accurate, reliable information, and in most cases will include advice from an appropriately qualified entity.
- The director should proactively consider and continuously assess the courses of action that might be available, and evaluate whether the courses of action are reasonably likely to lead to a better outcome than the immediate appointment of an administrator or liquidator. If necessary, the directors should revise the course(s) of action if, for example, there is new information or if unexpected issues arise.
- A course of action is reasonably likely to lead to a better outcome for the company if the course of action is based on relevant and accurate information, is developed using good judgement, and is objectively reasonable in the company’s circumstances.
It is clear from this analysis that ASIC expect the Better Outcome to be fully and properly assessed and the counterfactual to include a quantitative financial assessment of returns to creditors.
GUIDANCE FROM THE AUSTRALIAN INSTITUTE OF COMPANY DIRECTORS (AICD)
The AICD toolkit provides guidance for directors and suggests directors must continually assess the course of action including whether the course of action:
- Preserves or enhances asset value;
- Delivers greater returns to creditors/shareholders;
- Is based on short-term, controllable issues versus irreversible decline;
- Allows for renegotiation of contracts or restructured liabilities.
The toolkit emphasises that directors must act swiftly once distress is suspected—early planning assists in triggering protection.
Section | Detail |
Objective, Evidence-Based Assessment | Directors must conduct an objective evaluation to determine that the proposed course of action is reasonably likely to lead to a better outcome than immediate administration or liquidation. That means decisions should be supported by evidence—financial forecasts, documented rationale, and advice—and the expectation of success should be more than “fanciful or remote” |
Not a Guarantee of Success | The test doesn't demand perfection or absolute certainty. It's enough that there is a realistic possibility—a fair chance—that the plan will yield a better outcome. |
Required Steps to Support the Assessment | Directors should:
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Continuously Monitor & Reassess | The “reasonably likely” threshold isn't a one-off decision. As the restructuring progresses, directors must continually assess whether the plan remains on track to achieve the better outcome. If it stops being justifiable, they must pivot—either revise the plan or appoint an external administrator. |
EVALUATING A “BETTER OUTCOME” PRACTICAL TIPS
We conclude the current guidance on the better outcome test is broadly sufficient, as long as AQE’s take the guidance literally and seriously:
- When distressed emerges: the board should document suspicion or distress triggers.
- Plan development: outline strategic courses, supported by appropriate financial models and forecasts.
- Gather expert advice: including in particular from registered liquidators/ accountants /lawyers/ subject matter specialists.
- Evaluate options: compare projected financial outcomes of restructure vs immediate administration. That may include a liquidation and / or voluntary administration.
- Monitor outcomes: a board must regularly check if expectations hold true; be ready to pivot if they don’t.
- Records & transparency: maintain contemporaneous minutes, financials, and advice documents.
Published 30th July 2025

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